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Checkbochs: Use Hardware to Check Software
Sorav Bansal
Abstract
In this paper, we present a system called Checkbochs, a machine simulator that checks rules about its guest operating system
and applications at the hardware level. The properties to be checked can be implemented as ‘plugins’ in the Checkbochs simulator.
Some of the properties that were checked using Checkbochs include null-pointer checks, format-string vulnerabilities, user/kernel
pointer checks, and race-conditions. On implementing these checks, we were able to uncover previously-unknown bugs in widely
used Linux distributions. We also tested our tools on undergraduate coursework, and found numerous bugs.
Index Terms
Software Reliability, Machine Simulation, Type Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of software in many mission critical applications
has led computer scientists to focus on software reliability,
more than ever before. Many ways have been proposed to
make software more reliable, secure and bug-free. Broadly,
these techniques can be grouped into static compile-time
techniques and dynamic run-time techniques.
Static compile-time techniques analyze program source
code to detect errors. This method, though very effective
cannot take advantage of the information available at run-time.
Dynamic runtime techniques on the other hand mostly rely on
an interpreted environment, or instrumentation at source-code
or binary level. For this reason, dynamic runtime techniques
have seldom been used to test the correctness of an operat-
ing system. Instrumenting the source code or binary of an
operating system requires clever engineering effort and deep
understanding of the OS internals. Further, binary instrumen-
tation requires thorough understanding of the instruction set
architecture. And even when the instrumentation is complete
and correct, the execution of instrumented code can change
the behavior of the OS indeterministically due to a different
interleaving of concurrent threads.
In this paper, we present a dynamic runtime checker called
Checkbochs which has been implemented using an existing
x86 machine simulator called Bochs [5]. Since each machine
instruction in a simulator is interpreted, it allows us to do
complex runtime analyses without the pitfalls associated with
instrumentation. By tracking data flow at runtime, and check-
ing for some known properties, we found interesting bugs in
two widely used Linux distributions. We also implemented
a dynamic data race detector inside the simulator to be able
to find data races in operating systems. As a case study, we
checked an academic operating system called Pintos which
was built as part of undergraduate coursework at Stanford.
Some of our contributions are:
• Checkbochs allows dynamic runtime analysis by imple-
menting rules to be executed while interpreting instruc-
tions in the guest software.
• Checkbochs can identify bugs across all layers of soft-
ware running on the system. It does not require prior
knowledge of the applications or their source code before
reporting violations.
• Checkbochs does not change application or OS behavior
in any way since all its operations occur at the hardware
level. In fact, Checkbochs can be used on an existing disk
image.
• Implementing new runtime rules in Checkbochs is easy
and straightforward
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the
Checkbochs dataflow analysis framework that can be extended
to check various system rules at runtime. Section III describes
the implementation of one such rule - the dynamic data race
detector. Section IV discusses the related work, and finally
Section V concludes.
II. DYNAMIC DATA FLOW ANALYSIS
In our dynamic data flow analyses, we wish to infer types
of machine values and then check for violations of type-
properties at runtime. For example, if two file-descriptors are
multiplied at any point in the execution of the system, it signals
an error.
Checbochs provides a framework, which allows users to
specify data types and corresponding system rules to be
checked during runtime. In this section, we describe the
implementation of this framework and also the results obtained
by implementing some rules.
A. Implementation
To track types of machine values, Checkbochs maintains
a shadow machine state The shadow state consists of the
shadow registers, instructions and shadow physical memory.
Since the instructions use virtual memory addresses, we also
implemented a virtual-memory translation logic in the shadow
space.
Data flow is monitored by associating all data transfer and
arithmetic instructions (load, store, move, add, etc.) with
their counterparts in shadow space. For example, a move
dest, src instruction would also cause the contents of src
to be copied to dest in shadow space. Using this data flow
framework, we tag data values with their types in shadow space
and analyse their flow across the system. Some of the types
that we inferred using Checkbochs are tabulated in Table II-A
with their method of inference.
2Method Of Inference Types
Linux System Call Interface User Pointers, File Descriptors, Strings
x86 Instruction Operands I/O address, I/O bytes, NullChecked,
Memory Address, Code/Data
Planted Shadow Instructions in
Guest Software
malloc/fopen return value, user pointer
safety
TABLE I
TYPE VALUES AND THEIR METHOD OF INFERENCE AT THE
HARDWARE LEVEL
Sometimes, the flow of type information is not directly
associated with the corresponding data flow. For example,
consider the sample code of the read() system call in Figure
1. At the entry of the function, buf is an unchecked user
ssize_t sys_read(...,char *buf,...) {
char *tmp = buf;
if (!access_ok(tmp)) fail();
...
*buf = 42; /* safe? */
}
Fig. 1. The system call parameter buf is an unsafe user pointer. However,
since a derived variable tmp has been checked for safety, the assignment to
*buf should be considered legal.
pointer. The assignment statement tmp=buf changes the type
of tmp to an unsafe user pointer too. Subsequently, tmp goes
through the appropriate check and its type is changed to a safe
user pointer. However, the result of this check is not reflected
on the type of buf and the line *buf=42 will incorrectly
flag a warning.
We solved this problem by using an extra level of indirection
in the shadow space. Instead of holding the type value,
the shadow state holds pointers to type objects. Hence, an
assignment statement like tmp=buf causes the pointer to
buf’s type object to be copied to tmp’s shadow state. Since
both buf and tmp now point to the same type object, any
change in tmp’s type is reflected in buf’s type and vice versa.
This extra level of indirection is also illustrated in Figure 2
Registers
Memory
Machine State
tmp
buf
Pointers to Type Objects
Type Objects stored used
in a garbage collected region
Fig. 2. Pointers to Type Objects. Both tmp and buf point to the same
type object, after assignment of tmp to buf. Hence, any change to the type
of tmp will also reflect in the type of buf.
B. Results
We ran two different disk images on Checkbochs:
debian-3.0r1 and gentoo-2004.3. Both these disk
images were obtained after freshly installing the latest
available distribution CDs by these vendors. Using our
dataflow framework, we check for flavors of copyin/copyout
bugs, improper handling of malloc(), fopen() functions
and formatstring vulnerabilities. The results obtained by
performing these checks are described in detail in the
following sections.
1) CopyIn/CopyOut Bugs: A user value passed as a sys-
tem call argument must be checked through one of the
copyin/copyout functions before getting dereferenced. Failure
to do so, opens a port of attack, whereby an attacker can
crash the kernel, or worse be able to write his own data at a
specific kernel address. Another variation of this rule is that a
user pointer should never be dereferenced in the kernel with
disabled interrupts.
Implementing this rule using our data flow framework was
straightforward. All system call parameters are tagged as
unchecked user values. Any check on the user value through
one of the copyin/copyout functions cause the type of the user
value to change from unchecked to checked user value. A
warning is flagged if an unchecked user value is dereferenced
in the kernel or a user value is dereferenced with disabled
interrupts.
Using these rules, we identified one copyin/copyout bug in
the poll system call of the linux kernel. In this instance,
the user pointer was checked for read access, while a write
operation was performed on it. This can be a security flaw on
many architectures, including Intel 386. The submitted bug
was acknowledged by Alan Cox on the Linux Kernel Mailing
List [9].
2) Improper handling of malloc(), fopen() return
values: Any use of glibc functions like malloc() and
fopen() must be accompanied by a null check before they
are used. To check this rule, we tagged the return values
of these functions until they were checked against null.
Implementing this rule, we found many instances of violation
in the kernel and common applications like ps, grep, fsck,
and swapon. The violations in the kernel were found in the
IDE device driver of linux-2.4.18. In all, after minimal
testing, we found 16 bugs in user-level software and 6 bugs
in the kernel. All these bugs were accepted, and subsequently
fixed.
3) Formatstring Vulnerabilities: A formatstring
vulnerability [8] is caused due to a design misfeature
in the C standard library combined with problematic
implementation of variable argument functions. A value from
an untrusted source (such as the network) should not be used
without proper checks inside the formatstring argument of
the printf family of functions. Failure to do so, can lead
to a complete compromise of security, when combined with
other bugs. To test applications, we mounted an NFS partition
on the guest system and ran a number of applications on
it. Although, we hoped to obtain some bugs in applications
running on data in the untrusted NFS partition, we obtained
only one false positive in the sendmail program. In this
3Rule Kernel Bugs Application Bugs False Positives
Pointers/File Descriptors checked against NULL 6 16 0
CopyIn/CopyOut Bugs 1 - 4
Untrusted IO in FormatString 0 0 1
Fig. 3. Summary: The table summarizes the results obtained on implementing certain rules and checking two widely used Linux distributions. Besides
these rules, we implemented the race-detection algorithm in Checkbochs which uncovered numerous bugs in undergraduate coursework.
case, each character of the string received over the network
was carefully checked before using it in the formatstring.
Since our rule does not implement a way of finding out
whether a value has been appropriately checked for safety, it
reports a false warning.
In essence, we believe that machine simulation allows us
to track data flow across many different applications, which
would have been difficult (if not impossible) to do with
instrumentation techniques. We are investigating other uses
of this dataflow framework in determining interesting system
properties. Recently, dynamic dataflow tracing was used to
determine lifetime of sensitive data like passwords [6]. The
work revealed the startling result that sensitive information
could live in the system for a long time in places like system
caches and device buffers (places which are not in the control
of the application vendor).
III. RACE CONDITIONS
Multi-threaded programming is difficult and error-prone. It
is easy to make a mistake that produces a data race, yet it can
be extremely hard to locate this mistake during debugging.
A very effective dynamic data race detection algorithm is
the lockset algorithm, first proposed in a tool called Eraser
[16]. Eraser used binary rewriting techniques to monitor every
shared memory reference and verify that consistent locking be-
havior is observed. The lockset algorithm enforces the simple
locking discipline that every shared variable is protected by
some lock. Since there is no way of knowing which locks are
intended to protect which variables, this protection relation can
be inferred from the execution history. Figure 4 summarizes
the lockset algorithm. More details on the algorithm can be
found at [16].
We implemented the lockset algorithm in Checkbochs. On
testing undergraduate coursework [12], we found numerous
bugs in assignments that had received a near-perfect score.
We also found one benign race in the base operating system
pintos [13] provided to the students.
Let locks held(t) be the set of locks held by thread t
For each v, initialize lockset(v) to the set of all locks
On each access to v by thread t,
set lockset(v) := lockset(v)
⋂
locks − held(t);
if C(v) = {}, then issue a warning.
Fig. 4. The Lockset Algorithm
IV. RELATED WORK
There has been a growing impetus on software reliability
and security in recent years. Researchers have considered
many ways to perform post-production checks in software.
Static compile-time analysis with programmer written
compiler-extensions was used to catch around 500 bugs in
the linux kernel [1], [2]. Using static data flow analysis and
domain specific knowledge, many bugs were found in the
heavily audited kernel. Ways have also been suggested to au-
tomatically detect anomalies as deviant behavior in the source
code [3]. Most of the bugs checked by static analysis are local
to a single file, sometimes even local to a single procedure.
This is due to the complexity involved in performing global
compile time analysis. This limits the power of static analysis
tools to surface bugs. Our approach, on the other hand, can
track data flow across many different software components
possibly written by different vendors and can thus target a
different variety of errors. However, static analysis has the
huge advantage of being able to check all possible code paths,
while our execution-driven approach can only check bugs
along the path of execution in the system.
Recently, model checking was used to find serious file
system errors [4]. Using an abstract model and intelligent
reduction of the state space, they could check for errors which
would have required an exponential number of search paths
through traditional testing. Model checking can check for
deeper semantic bugs than possible with static compile-time
analysis. We intend to use similar ideas to model check entire
system images, thus allowing us to search a larger number
of execution paths while performing our shadow machine
analysis. One of the obstacles in this direction is the slow speed
of machine simulation that makes execution of speculative
paths almost infeasible.
Shadow machine simulation has been previously used to
perform taint analysis to determine the data lifetime of sensi-
tive data [6]. This work reported a startling observation that
sensitive data like passwords and credit card numbers may
reside in computer’s memory and disk long after the user has
logged out. Such leaks occur at caches, I/O buffers, kernel
queues, and other places which are not under the control of the
application developer. Our work uses a similar taint analysis by
marking all bytes received over the network as untrusted and
checking if they are used in unwanted ways (eg. formatstring).
Recently, [15] used taint-analysis on untrusted data to check
for security violations such as buffer overflows and format-
string attacks in applications. By implementing a valgrind skin,
they were able to restrict the overhead of their taint-analysis
tool to 10-25x. Considering that the computation power is
relatively cheap, they suggest using their tool in production
4runs of the software. This will detect and prevent any online
attacks on the system.
V. CONCLUSION
We present a novel technique to finding bugs and security
holes in system software. Our technique can check for bugs
across all layers of software, from the OS to the application.
Our approach has very low false positive and false negative
rates. This technique can be especially very useful in expedit-
ing the process of discovering bugs during software testing.
We conjecture that shadow machine simulation, combined
with speculative execution (such as model-checking) can yield
a huge number of bugs. While the slow speed of machine
simulation is an impediment to this approach, we are consid-
ering using virtual machine environments to achieve the same
objective.
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